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Abstract: Through the lens of China in Africa, this paper explores the transfor-
mations in the relationship between the Internet and the state. China’s econom-
ic success, impressive growth of Internet users and relative stability have quietly
promoted an example of how the Internet can be deployed within the larger polit-
ical and economic strategies of developing states, moving beyond the democrati-
zation paradigm promoted in the West. New evidence suggests that this model is
becoming increasingly popular, but it is not clear why and how it is spreading.
Through a case study comparison of an emerging democracy, Kenya, and a semi-
authoritarian country, Ethiopia, where China has recently increased its involve-
ment in the communications sector, this paper investigates whether and how the
ideas of state stability, development and community that characterize the strate-
gies pursued by the Chinese government are influencing and legitimizing the
development of a less open model of the Internet. It analyses how new ideas, tech-
nologies and norms integrate with existing ones and which factors influence their
adoption or rejection. It is based on fieldwork conducted in Ethiopia and in Kenya
between 2011 and 2013, where data was collected through mapping Internet
related projects involving Chinese companies and authorities, analysing Internet
policies and regulations, and interviewing officials in Ministries of Communica-
tion, media lawyers, Internet activists, and Chinese employed in the media and
telecommunication sector in Kenya and Ethiopia. Keywords: China, Internet,
Africa, state policies, Kenya, Ethiopia.
Resumen: Desde la óptica de China en África, este artículo explora las trans-
formaciones en la relación entre Internet y el estado. El éxito económico de
China, el impresionante crecimiento de usuarios de Internet y estabilidad relativa
ha promovido un ejemplo tranquilo de cómo Internet puede ser desplegado
dentro de las más amplias estrategias políticas y económicas de los estados en
desarrollo, más allá del paradigma de la democratización promovida en Occi-
dente. Existen nuevas evidencias que sugieren que este modelo está siendo cada
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vez más popular, pero no está claro por qué y cómo se está extendiendo. A través
de un estudio de caso comparativo de una democracia emergente, Kenia, y un
país semi-autoritario, Etiopía, donde China ha aumentado recientemente su
participación en el sector de las comunicaciones, este trabajo investiga hasta qué
punto y de qué manera las ideas de la estabilidad del Estado, el desarrollo y la
comunidad que caracterizan las estrategias adoptadas por el gobierno chino están
influyendo y legitimando el desarrollo de un modelo menos abierto de Internet.
Se analiza cómo las nuevas ideas, tecnologías y normas se integran con las ya exis-
tentes y qué factores influyen en su adopción o rechazo. El artículo se basa en el
trabajo de campo llevado a cabo en Etiopía y en Kenia entre 2011 y 2013, donde
se recogieron datos a través del análisis de proyectos relacionados con Internet en
los que participan empresas y autoridades chinas, así como el estudio de las polí-
ticas y reglamentos de internet, y complementando con entrevistas a funciona-
rios de los Ministerios de Comunicación, especialistas en derecho de las comu-
nicaciones, activistas de Internet, así como profesionales chinos del sector de las
telecomunicaciones en Kenia y Etiopía. Palabras clave:China, Internet, África,
políticas públicas, Kenia, Etiopía.
1. Introduction
Since the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which took
place in Beijing in 2006, the Chinese media have begun a steady march to get
closer to Africa and to gain influence in its mediasphere. This process has displa-
yed signs of continuity and discontinuity with China’s previous attempts to
influence ideas and perceptions on the continent. It has included both old and
new communication technologies, and has developed through a mix of bold
policy decisions as well as trials and errors. 
The relocation of the Regional Editorial Office for Africa of the state contro-
lled news agency Xinhua from Paris to Nairobi in 2006 represented the first
symbolic step of this new strategy.1 The same year, China Radio International also
began to seek partnerships with national broadcasters in Africa to relay some of its
content and make it more accessible to local audiences (Cooper, 2009). The
expansion of traditional media has been followed by some unprecedented initia-
tives in the new media and telecommunication sector. In 2011, Xinhua launched
what it labelled as the first “mobile newspaper” in Africa (Xinhua News Agency,
2011). Developed in Kenya in partnership with Huawei, China’s largest telecom-
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[01] Xinhua’s correspondents had historically been China’s eyes and ears on the continent, even befo-
re China had established embassies in Africa, but while Xinhua’s had established numerous
national bureaux (the first in Egypt in 1956), it had never had a regional office for Africa. 
munications and service company, and Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile opera-
tor, it allowed mobile subscribers to receive news selected by Xinhua via Multi-
media Messaging Service (MMS). The project was only partially successful and
it was discontinued in 2012, but it signalled a willingness on the part of Chinese
companies and media to experiment with new formats and find alternative ways
to compete in an increasingly crowded “market for loyalties” (Price, 2002). Along-
side these media initiatives, which have been aimed at reaching wider audiences
in Africa through different channels, since 2006 the Chinese government and
Chinese companies have also begun to play an increasingly important role in the
continent’s telecommunication sector, as symbolized by the multi-billion dollar
loan from China’s EXIM Bank to the Ethiopian government’s Ethio-Telecom, the
country’s sole telecom operator, to increase access to the Internet and mobile
phones, a project later undertaken by Chinese telecom giants ZTE and Huawei
(Gagliardone, Stremlau, & Nkrumah, 2012).
These initiatives present both signs of continuity and discontinuity with the
past. China’s diplomatic relations with Africa date back to the 1950s and have been
characterized from the very beginning by the provision of aid and by attempts to
communicate not just with elites but with African audiences at large (Brautigam,
2009; Chau, 2007). China’s Prime Minister Chou En-lai first articulated China’s
strategy of engagement with Africa during his visit to the continent 1964, and,
despite claims that today’s China is transforming development practice in Africa,
the modes of its engagement seems to have remained almost unchanged. As
Chou’s first two points indicate: 
The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equa-
lity and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards
such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual and helpful to
economic cooperation.
In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly
respects the sovereignty and independence of the recipient countries, and
never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges (Hevi, 1967).
Together with the other six principles, which offer a more detailed indica-
tion of the financial instruments that China would employ when providing aid
and of the lifestyle Chinese workers should adopt abroad, these continue to repre-
sent the pillars of China’s engagement with the continent also in the new millen-
nium (Brautigam, 2009). 
Some important differences, however, do exist between China’s past and
present efforts in Africa. I focus on three here, which are particularly relevant for the
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media. The first is the disappearance of ideology from the language of China-Afri-
ca cooperation. In 1964, together with the eight principles regulating aid and
cooperation highlighted above, Chou enunciated other five principles substan-
tiating the type of political engagement China was concurrently seeking in the
continent. The first principle declared that “China supports the Arab and African
peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and
to win and safeguard national independence” (Hevi, 1967, p. 8). China’s efforts
in Africa during de-colonization were closely linked to its efforts to export and
strengthen the socialist revolution in the continent (Chau, 2007; Tan-Mullins,
Mohan, & Power, 2010). Today, these have largely been replaced by admissions
of China’s interest in Africa’s resources and untapped potential. It is as if the dele-
tion of the socialist cause as the goal of China-Africa engagement had promoted
the principles of “mutual benefit” and “sovereignty and independence” to the rank
of ideological guides of the new engagement. 
A second major difference between China’s earlier and current presence in
Africa depends on the sheer scale of resources China is now able to deploy on the
continent. While in the 1960s-1970s China had to partially disengage from Afri-
ca because of the damage the “great leap forward” and the “cultural revolution”
were causing to its own economy (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012), the 2000s-2010s
belong to an era of plenty and Chinese actors, including Chinese media, have
been able to invest and operate in spaces where others simply do not have the
resources to act. 
A final, closely connected, element characterizing contemporary China-
Africa relations is the mix of interest and fear they are producing among tradi-
tional donor countries. While during the Cold-War China’s presence in Afri-
ca was minimized by the competition between the USA and the USSR (Chau,
2007; Shinn & Eisenman, 2012), today’s China is acting as a game changer.
In 2011, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her visit to Tanza-
nia made the USA’s concerns clear about the possibilities of a “new colonia-
lism” in Africa and a few months later, UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s
warned its audience in Lagos that new forms of “authoritarian capitalism” may
take root in the continent. Similar concerns have been expressed also about
the detrimental role China may have in the media sector in Africa, increasing
authoritarianism and undermining Western efforts to promote openness and
freedom of expression (Farah & Mosher, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2007). These
concerns are largely based on the assumptions that, as Western countries have
tried to promote their models in Africa, China will try to export its own. No
studies to date, however, have proved this to be the case, and greater empiri-
cal evidence is needed to fully understand the nature, scope and implications
of China’s new role in the African mediasphere. This article aims at providing
a contribution in this direction, adding to ongoing efforts to understand
China’s role in Africa in empirical rather than ideological terms that have
characterized works in development studies and international relations (see
for example Brautigam, 2009; Shinn & Eisenman, 2012), but have so far had
little application to the media. 
2. Partner, prototype or persuader? 
China’s increasing involvement in the media in Africa can represent a critical
entry point to understand the broader political implications of China–Africa
relationship. So far, however, similarly to what has been the case in other areas
where China has stepped up its presence, there has been a tendency to frame
its role in relation to what Western countries have done or are doing on the
continent, rather than in its own terms. Hillary Clinton has warned Africans
about risks of a “new colonialism”, a concept that belongs to the history of
Europe in Africa rather than of China, while David Cameron has spoken of
“authoritarian capitalism”, suggesting how China may be adding darker tones
to ideas the West has tried to promote on the continent for decades.2 In the case
of the media, this tendency has been evident in the alarms raised about the pos-
sibility that China could act as a net exporter of authoritarianism (Farah &
Mosher, 2010), selling its own strategies of media development and media con-
trol abroad and countering the efforts of countries such as the US and the UK
which, while stressing the role of the media in the democratization of Africa,
have encouraged the adoption of aspects characterizing their own media
models (Price, 2002; Putzel & Van der Zwan, 2006). 
Elsewhere I have proposed a framework that can encourage understanding
of Chinese engagement in the African mediasphere for its original contributions,
and not simply as a negative of the impression left by the West (Gagliardone,
Stremlau, and Nkrumah 2012). This framework emerged as part of a collective
effort among scholars from Africa, China and Europe who gathered in Oxford
in 2010 to explore ways to approach the study of China’s emerging role in the
media in Africa, balancing out different perspectives and building a shared rese-
arch agenda. The framework was tested and further refined through fieldwork in
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[02] For Hillary Clinton’s remarks see for example Flavia Krause-Jackson, ‘Clinton Chastises China on
Internet, African ‘New Colonialism’ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-11/clinton-chas-
tises-china-on-internet-african-new-colonialism-.html. And for David Cameron’s see Jason
Groves, ‘Cameron warns Africans over the 'Chinese invasion' as they pour billions into continent’
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2016677/Cameron-warns-Africans-Chinese-invasion-
pour-billions-continent.html Last accessed 13 July.
Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.3 This framework breaks down China’s actions on
the continent according to China’s ability to act as a partner, a prototype, and a
persuader. These categories are meant to add greater nuance to the analysis of
China’s actions on the continent, questioning whether or not China’s role as a
partner sponsoring media and ICT projects on the continent is facilitating the
diffusion of some aspects that characterise its domestic media system, rather than
assuming this will be the case. They seek to de-ideologise the debate on Western
versus Eastern developmental models, enabling research findings to show, for
example, how the partnership between China and a given African country may
enhance some aspects of the local media that fit within a Western liberal frame-
work while they do not belong to China’s media system. Finally, they allow rese-
arch to highlight areas of collaboration between different development actors,
where their relative strengths can enable common goals to be reached, but also
common patterns of exploitation, where the interventions of different donors con-
tribute to empower specific actors, such as government’s, and disempower others.
Each category is briefly described below. 
China’s role as a partner is apparent in the resources it provides to African
countries to implement projects that are deemed important for social and eco-
nomic development. China has provided substantial financial and technical
inputs to the expansion of the ICT infrastructure in authoritarian regimes (as in
the case of Ethiopia discussed below), but also in democratic countries such as
Ghana, where its contribution of US$ 180 million has helped realizing one of
the most ambitious e-government projects in West Africa, reinforcing the ability
of the central administration to communicate with the peripheries of the state
and to provide more effective services to citizens (Gagliardone et al., 2012).
China has similarly offered support to state broadcasters in selected countries:
Kenya and Zambia are the most popular examples (Banda 2009). Even if China
has traditionally felt uncomfortable with the term ‘donor’ (Brautigam 2010;
Mawdsley 2012), the activities it sponsors in this area are those usually funded by
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, and, in some cases, China has offered
an alternative to traditional donors for African countries willing to develop pro-
jects in this area. But while the role of Western donors as partners has usually
been conditional upon the acceptance of at least some of the elements charac-
teristic of Western media systems, China has stressed its intention to maintain a
separation between these two dimensions and its willingness to simply respond
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[03] More information about the workshop’s programme, participants and outcomes can be accessed
at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/research/project/china-and-africa-media-policy. Last accessed
10.09.2013.
to the demands of its African partners. While this ‘no strings attached’ policy may
be consistent, this does not mean that it is neutral or free of impact. For example,
while Western donors have tended to favour media projects benefitting the pri-
vate sector and the civil society, or projects creating incentives for the state to
open a dialogue with other forces in society, China has displayed a tendency to
privilege government actors, thus increasing governments’ capacity vis-à-vis other
critical components in the development of a media system. Within this dimen-
sion, assessing who benefits from China’s increased role as a partner in the media
sector becomes particularly important.
China in also increasingly perceived as a prototype by countries seeking to
balance between investment in ICTs and containment of the risks of political
instability new technologies may bring. In a Wikileaks cable reporting a meeting
between Sebhat Nega, one of the Ethiopian government’s ideologues, and the
then US ambassador Donald Yamamoto, for example, Sebhat was reported to
have openly declared his admiration for China and stressed that Ethiopia "needs
the China model to inform the Ethiopian people".4 Some have called its mix of
proactive and reactive measures aimed at facilitating a controlled expansion of
the Internet while leaving the established power structure unchallenged,
‘Chinese media model’ (Farah & Mosher 2010). China, however, has historically
been reluctant to label its own as a model ready to be exported, preferring to refer
to specific, but not necessarily cohesive, strategies it has adopted to face the pro-
blems it encountered throughout its own development. Some of these strategies
may be copied and adapted by other countries but Chinese leaders and diplo-
mats have tended to challenge the idea of China as an “active teacher”, a term
coined by Martha Finnemore (1993) to describe international actors attempting
to socialize other countries to new ideas and practices. 
Finally, China’s role in Africa can be assessed according to its modality and
ability to act as a persuader, shaping opinions in ways that favour either its image
abroad or a particular agenda it supports. This third dimension is in the realm of
public diplomacy, which China has stepped up through expanding the reach and
content of its international broadcasters, including China Central Television and
China Radio International, and of its news agency, Xinhua. Furthermore, cultu-
ral diplomacy has grown through the continued establishment of Confucius ins-
titutes, and programs that offer scholarships for foreign students and journalists
to study in China. Still within its role of persuader, China has concurrently pur-
sued a strategy that has distinguished it from its Western competitors, maximising
the symbolic value of some of the projects it sponsors in Africa, such as roads, the-
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[04] Wikileaks cable: #09ADDISABABA149 Last accessed 13 July 2013.
atres, libraries and hospitals, which can symbolize China’s support to both lite-
rate and illiterate populations. 
This paper adopts this framework to compare the influence of China on the
development of telecommunications, and of the Internet more specifically, in
two countries that have adopted very different approaches towards shaping their
national information societies. One is Kenya, which is often referred to as Africa’s
information hub, because of its leading role in promoting local innovation, from
mobile banking to crisis responses systems. The other is Ethiopia, the only
country on the continent where Internet provision is still a state monopoly, whose
government actively blocks opposition websites, but has also heavily invested in
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to improve service deli-
very, even in the most remote areas. 
Since 2006, China has become an important player in both countries, at a
diplomatic level, offering an alternative to traditional donors and allies, especially
in moments of political crisis; and as new development actor, sponsoring projects
that are deemed important by respective governments. This paper seeks to
address some of the consequences China’s renewed engagement is having on the
development of the Internet and of national information societies in both coun-
tries. It first offers a brief overview of the development of the internet and of tele-
communication in Kenya and in Ethiopia and then examines which impacts
China has had on these countries’ trajectories. 
3. The Ethiopian internet before China 
The development of the Internet in Ethiopia, while similar to the path taken by
other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, has certain distinctive charac-
teristics. Together with Djibouti, whose population is less than a million, Ethiopia
is the only other country in Africa with a single, state controlled Internet Service
Provider. As argued by Ethiopia’s Minister of Information and Communication
Technology, when he was at the helm of Ethiopia’s ICT Development Agency:
“Monopoly is a crucial factor. It is exactly because ICTs are so important and they
have the capacity to penetrate every aspect of our lives that we have to make sure
that it is the state that is in charge of using and implementing them. In this phase
we cannot leave it to the market. ICTs are too key for our development. They are
a priority. Behind the decision of leaving the monopoly in the ICTs and telecom-
munication market there is big philosophical thinking. It is not just because we
want to make money from the use of telecoms.”5
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[05] Interview: Debretsion Gebre Michael, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 10 June 2008.
The mix of commitment to using new technology and fear that the same
technology could unsettle existing power structures is reflected in the govern-
ment’s massive efforts to use digital media in schools and government offices,
and the neglect of providing reliable and affordable Internet connections in the
major towns, including the capital (Gagliardone, 2009). Ethiopia has histori-
cally had one of the lowest Internet penetration rates in the world.6 Despite the
very limited diffusion of the Internet among Ethiopian citizens, in 2006 the
government began to actively filter the websites of opposition groups and human
rights organizations, specifically targeting those that gathered the voices of Ethio-
pians living abroad (Opennet Initiative, 2007).
One reason for blocking these online spaces can be attributed to the
composition of the Ethiopian diaspora and to the ability of the discourses it arti-
culates to reach beyond the digital media. Similar to other national groups that
migrated from the Horn, Ethiopians living abroad represent a large and power-
ful force that have historically been involved in wars and politics back home
(Lyons, 2007). 
But, in sharp contrast to the cases of Kenya, Eritrea and Somaliland, the
great majority of politically-minded Ethiopians in the diaspora have opposed the
political agenda of the incumbent government led by the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Many posts hosted in online spaces
such as Nazret.com or Ethiopianreview.com, two popular websites blocked in
Ethiopia, aim at the very core of the EPRDF national project, refusing to recog-
nize the current government as either legitimate or as the expression of the
people’s will. Before the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi it was not
uncommon to find a blog post labelling him as “crime minister” or describing
the government as a dictatorship led by an ethnic minority. On the other hand,
pro-government websites have responded by accusing opponents of chauvinism
and of encouraging tensions within multi-ethnic Ethiopia similar to those that
led to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Gagliardone & Stremlau, 2011). 
This vehemence and polarization are not exclusive to online spaces and are
evident in the long history of engagement –or lack of engagement– between the
EPRDF on one hand, and other political forces in Ethiopia and the diaspora on
the other. Since coming to power the EPRDF has chosen not to negotiate with
its adversaries, preferring to expand its influence and presence on the ground by
delivering progress rather than enlarging its base by incorporating new forces and
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[06] In 2000 Ethiopia had an Internet penetration of 0,02%, which grew to only 1,48% in 2012. Source
ITU. Last accessed 13 July 2013: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statis-
tics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls
perspectives. This strategy has been applied to both old and new media. After
coming to power, in response to internal and external pressures, the EPRDF allo-
wed for unprecedented levels of freedom of expression, but they did not develop
a strategy for reconciling or negotiating with the forces that were defeated or mar-
ginalized (Stremlau, 2011). 
As a result, journalists who were fired from the Ministry of Information and
sympathized with those opposed to the EPRDF were given the opportunity to set
up independent newspapers and use them as platforms for criticizing the govern-
ment. The decision of the EPRDF to ignore these voices, or attack them without
engaging with their arguments, exacerbated the polarization over time. A few
years later, when the first websites were created for an Ethiopian audience, the
EPRDF took a similar approach and largely ignored them. 
The divide between pro- and anti-government forces has widened over
time, having consequences in the aftermath of the elections in 2005 when the
EPRDF reacted to its substantial electoral losses by imprisoning opponents and
firing on demonstrators. Prominent journalists were arrested, their papers closed,
and, the following year, blogs were also blocked to silence all alternative voices.
As a result, both old and new media in Ethiopia now carry pro-government infor-
mation or criticism that can be easily managed by the ruling elite and does not
challenge its fundamental political goals of retaining power and reinforcing its
vision of ethnic federalism.
4. Kenya before China 
The history of the Internet in Kenya cannot be more different  from Ethiopia.
Kenya has been one of the first countries in Africa to liberalize telecommunications
and to develop a strategy that, while offering limited privileges to the former incum-
bent telecom (Telecom Kenya) such as the monopoly to operate the Internet gate-
way and backbone until 2004, allowed different companies to immediately enter
the market, driving down prices and expanding access. As a result Kenya has now
one of the most competitive Internet sectors in East Africa, with national and inter-
national companies offering both mobile and landline services. As of 2012 Safari-
com had 69% of the Internet market, Aritel 14%, Orange 9% and Essar 8%. Of
these subscriptions, 99% were through mobile (Souter & Kerretts-Makau, 2012).
The Kenyan government has also taken an innovative approach towards
involving a variety of actors, from private companies to civil society organizations,
in shaping the national internet. Kenya was the first country in Africa to create a
national Internet Governance Forum after the creation of a Global Internet
Governance Forum in 2007. Other initiatives, such as Vision 2030 which was set
up to define the priorities for Kenya’s development and has placed significant
index.comunicación | nº 3(2) | New African Communication
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emphasis on the role ICT can play in national growth, included consultative
processes that could allow a variety of actors to contribute shaping the future of the
nation. As a result, the evolution of the Kenyan Internet has been characterized
by the inclusion of different interests at different stages, with the state acting both
as a facilitator and as a driver of innovation. 
5. Ethiopia after China 
After the elections in 2005, which were considered the most democratic and
contested in the country, but also led to violence and a crackdown on opposi-
tional forces contesting the results, the Ethiopian government became the
object of increased criticism from the International Community, especially from
Western donors, and started looking more insistently at China for support. This
led to an increasing number of agreements between the two countries and the
telecommunication sector emerged as one of the most important to realize the
EPRDF’s goal to promote economic growth and maintaining control over the
country. At an ideational level, China’s ability to balance control of information
and dramatic growth of Internet users started to be looked at as a model and
source of legitimation for the restrictive practices the Ethiopian government had
started employing in the aftermath of the elections. The conception of the infor-
mation society that has progressively emerged in China appeared more in line
with the EPRDF’s ambition to make Ethiopia a developmental state that could
pursue sustained growth and stability. But China has not supported Ethiopia
only ideationally and indirectly. It has also offered technical and financial means
to support the government’s strategy. In the second half of the 2000s, as privati-
zed telecommunication markets were booming in most of Africa providing chea-
per and increasingly reliable access to mobile phones and the Internet, Ethio-
pia faced the challenge of having to balance between its decision to retain
monopoly over telecommunication and the inability of expanding access
without opening to competition. The EPRDF’s stubbornness could not last for
long, unless a new partner could provide enough resources to introduce a
dramatic increase in access and quality of service in a regime of monopoly.
China obliged by offering the largest loan in the history of telecommunication in
Africa: 1.5$ billion to overhaul Ethiopia’s telecommunication system, expanding
mobile service and Internet connectivity while keeping Ethio-Telecom as the
only player in the market.7 Some of these resources also went to upgrading the
[07] See Zhao Lili, ‘Contributing to the Development of Ethiopia with Wisdom and Strength’
http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/endata/magazine/ztetechnologies/2009year/no6/articles/-
200906/t20090612_172517.html Last accessed 13 July 2013.
infrastructure on which the e-government projects were based, allowing a system
that many had considered unsustainable to become an even stronger compo-
nent of the government communication strategy towards the periphery. 
The role China had in Ethiopia was of paramount importance. Without
China’s support in extending the infrastructure and expanding the plan the
EPRDF had devised, the government of Ethiopia would have been either forced
to change its course and liberalize, or to condemn the country to suffer from
lack of connectivity to the Internet and mobile communication on which many
countries on the continent have been relying to support both economic growth
and state operation. 
6. Kenya after China 
Given the different context in which the Internet developed in Kenya, the role
China came to play was significantly different from Ethiopia, but also presen-
ted some elements of similarity. As in Ethiopia, China has been deeply invol-
ved in the extension of Internet connectivity in different capacities. First,
through telecom companies Huawei and ZTE. Together with French com-
pany Sagem, they participated in the first National Optic Fibre Backbone
Infrastructure (NOFBI) expansion, brining fibre optic to the main urban cen-
tres and allowing a first series of e-government projects to be delivered regio-
nally.8 The country was split into three sections, namely Western Kenya, Coast
and North Eastern, and Central –each region handled by one company–.
Sagem has laid out cables in Coast and North Eastern, Huawei in Nairobi and
Central, and ZTE in Western Kenya. Also investors such as Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and telecommunication operators have benefited as NOFBI
lowered the cost of entry to business. A second round of NOFBI (known as
NOFBI II) was directly funded with Chinese resources. In 2012 China’s EXIM
Bank provided a $71 million loan to support further extension to 36 adminis-
trative district centres across the country, with the objective of allowing also
people in remote areas to access faster Internet. A condition for the loan was
that the implementing agency had to be Huawei, which is now in charge of the
realization of the project.9 As in Ethiopia, the Chinese government and
Chinese companies have thus supported the expansions of government led
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[08] See, for example, Okuttah Mark, ‘Telkom Kenya set to run fibre network on behalf of govern-
ment’ http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Telkom-Kenya-set-to-run-fibre-net-
work-on-behalf-of-government/-/539550/929626/-/m96mry/-/index.html Last accessed 13
July 2013
[09] See, for example, Margaret Wahito, ‘Kenya: China to Fund Kenya's Fibre Optic Project’
http://allafrica.com/stories/201206290024.html Last accessed 13 July 2013.
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initiatives aimed at extending Internet connectivity and improving e-govern-
ment services. In the Kenyan case, however, Chinese support has fitted in a
much wider context, where a plurality of actors have been competing to offer
better services at lower prices. For example, soon after the signing of the agree-
ment for NOFBI II, Kenya’s leading telecom operator, Safaricom, decided to
invest additional $95 million to build an additional 2,400 kilometre fibre optic
cable to support its growing customer base. Interestingly, a large share of the
contract has been assigned on a commercial basis to Huawei, which had alre-
ady worked in collaboration with Safaricom to roll out the 4G network at a cost
of $143 million. A remaining share of Safaricom’s expansion project was assig-
ned to Ericsson.10
As it had been the case in Ethiopia, after Kenya’s highly contested and
violent elections, that took place in 2007 and led to numerous deaths and displa-
cements and to condemnation from the international community, the rela-
tionship between the Kenyan government and the Chinese government incre-
ased both in quantity and in quality. This is mostly connected to the Chinese
policy of providing aid and engaging in agreements without any strings attached.
Therefore, as relations with governments such as the US and the UK reached a
low point in the aftermath of the elections and later with the indictment of the
two presidential candidates Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court in relation to the alleged role they played in the incidents
of 2007-08, China managed to keep a low profile, stressing its faith in the legiti-
macy of Kenyan institutions. 
7. Conclusion: global and national rhetoric of the Internet 
Both in the case of the Kenyan and of Ethiopian governments, the violence that
followed their respective elections was employed as a reason to stress the poten-
tially disruptive role that technology, including the Internet, could play in increa-
sing divisiveness and harm peace. While in the case of Ethiopia this discourse had
been used for a long time to justify state monopoly, Kenya, a country that had hea-
vily invested in the idea of an open Internet, woke up to a new reality and pro-
gressively developed a new discourse framing peace as the overarching goal each
Kenyan, from media houses to bloggers to telecom operators, should give priority
to in shaping the country’s future. As one interviewer put it, “Kenya has been
slowly sliding from democracy to a peaceocracy”. This rhetoric was employed to
[10] See, for example, Okuttah Mark, ‘Safaricom loosens China’s grip on local contracts with Sh14bn
tender’ http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Safaricom-loosens-China-grip-on-
local-contracts/-/539550/1638364/-/11xotu6z/-/index.html Last accessed 13 July 2013.
justify for example the censoring of thousands of SMS considered harmful and
inciting ethnic hatred or to ask media houses to downplay cases of ethnic violence
still happening in the country.11 In both the Ethiopian and the Kenyan case, howe-
ver, it was not just incumbent governments, but also Western donors that stressed
the importance of creating mechanisms that could lead to peaceful elections and
prevent outbursts of violence. With regard to the media the idea that progressively
emerged was that of a harmonious information space, where people could still be
allowed to be critical and comment negatively on political actors, but could not
incur in actions possibly leading to forms of mobilization considered harmful by
public authorities. The idea of the Internet that progressively emerged was not dif-
ferent from the one offered by the detailed study of the Chinese Internet carried
out by King, Pan, and Roberts (2012), which showed how it was mostly posts lea-
ding to the organization of protests that were removed, rather than those attacking
the government for misconduct, for example for corruption. In both Kenya and
Ethiopia this idea progressively emerged and gained momentum without the
Chinese government or Chinese companies engaging in any notable activity to
advocate for this particular model. From the interviews carried out with Ethiopian
and Kenyan members of the government, civil servants, but also with members of
the civil society and private entrepreneurs in 2012 and 2013, none of them refe-
rred to Chinese authorities as trying to suggest that their model could be produc-
tively applied to the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases. 
The conclusions are still highly tentative, but it seems that some of the stra-
tegies adopted by the Chinese government in China to control and contain the
national interned are gaining popularity in both countries, despite no attempts
form the side of China to promote them abroad. It can be argued that China’s
appeal as a prototype has increased, without its government necessarily having to
engage in activities to persuade its African counterparts. In a climate where local
actors, such as the Ethiopian and the Kenyan government, and in the case of
Kenya also the local media, private operators, and international organizations,
created a political context privileging peace and development over allowing a
plurality of voices to compete in the marketplace of ideas, China had simply to
act as a partner, offering unconditional help to governments, to put forward a
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[11] See, for example, Lillian Onyango, ‘PS now names blogs over hate messages’
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/News/PS-now-names-blogs-over-hate-messages/-
/1290/1662804/-/format/xhtml/-/hk21w0/-/index.html; Fred Mukinda, ‘Phone firms block
300,000 hate texts daily, says Ndemo’ http://mobile.nation.co.ke/News/Phone-firms-block-
300-000-hate-texts-daily-says-Ndemo-/-/1290/1726172/-/format/xhtml/-/2e787c/-
/index.html; Njoroge Kaburo and Peter Mutai, ‘Kenya decries use of social to spread hate spe-
ech’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-03/15/c_132236743.htm Last accessed
13 July 2013. 
concept of harmony that it supports. While there was satisfaction that the
Kenyan elections were conducted peacefully, as peacefully were the elections
that took place earlier in Ethiopia in 2010, privileging peace also meant down-
playing critical voices, such as those of civil society organizations, lamenting that
grave misconducts and violations of human rights had been marginalized in the
name of a peaceful development that could benefit both countries. 
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